UA23
H8
AME
1
12
~~52~~

IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR WAR?

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER

UA
23
H8
~~AME~~

LIBRARY

OF THE

WAR DEPARTMENT.

Classification *UA 23.48*

Form No. 25, O. C. S.
(Ed. 7-19-07-2,000.)

copy 3

501/2

IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR WAR?

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

HONORABLE WILLIAM H. TAFT

SECRETARY OF WAR

REPRINTED FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW
FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1906

TEN CENTS EACH

07
MAH

IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR WAR?

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

HONORABLE WILLIAM H. TAFT

SECRETARY OF WAR

REPRINTED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW
FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1906

NEW YORK
NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW PUBLISHING CO.
MAY, 1907

The article now reprinted is identical with that which originally appeared in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for February and March, 1906, with the exception of the fact that the data contained on pages 18, 28, 38 and 40-45 has been brought down to May, 1907, by the addition of the last obtainable statistics.

F. L. H.

Copyright, 1906, 1907, by
North American Review Publishing Company

All Rights Reserved

INTRODUCTION.

EVERY American who has the defence of the country seriously at heart ought to read Mr. Huidekoper's article, "Is the United States Prepared for War?" It follows closely the arguments of that admirable history of "The Military Policy of the United States," by General Emory Upton, who may properly be considered the greatest military writer and critic that this country has produced, and what he has said and recommended may well be taken as a proper standard by which to judge the progress or retrogression in our military establishment.

Mr. Huidekoper has dealt with our military forces from the standpoint of a business man—a totally new point of view—and he has demonstrated the fallacy of intrusting our destinies to inadequately trained officers and soldiers. Assuredly, we have no right as a nation to ask our citizens to expose themselves as enlisted men in battle without reducing the chances of disaster and death by proper military education.

In the last six years we have taken great steps forward, but a great deal still remains to be done. Our sudden colonial expansion and the Monroe Doctrine, which is approved by both the great national parties, and which has been repeatedly announced as the policy of the government by various Presidents and Secretaries of State, involve responsibilities which cannot be lightly disregarded or thrust aside. To maintain a high rank among the nations requires adequate military forces, and the ability to compel recognition of any doctrine depends upon the power to enforce it of the nation which asserts it. The voice of the United States in favor of international justice is much more weighty when it is known to have a good navy and good army to enforce its views and defend its rights. We cannot and should not maintain a large regular army, but for a nation of eighty millions, or, counting in the people who live in our dependencies, nearly ninety

millions of people, a regular army of 100,000 men is a small force, considering especially the fact of the remoteness of the Philippines, the Isthmus of Panama, Porto Rico, and Alaska. It is a less percentage than was the army in Washington's time, in Jefferson's time, or indeed in Madison's time. Certainly the force upon which we must depend for quick action will be the regular army, and if that is not promptly effective immediately disaster will follow. In addition to the regular army there should be a provision for an efficient reserve of national volunteers, and such a plan for the co-operation of the militia forces of the States with the Federal Government and its military establishment as to make that force able to repel invasion and constitute an effective part of our national defence.

It is a fact, whether the American citizens realize it or not, that time is indispensable to the making of good soldiers. Our own sad experience proves this proposition, but our confidence in ourselves and in our power of quickly adapting circumstances to meet any national emergency so far has carried some of our public men that they have been deliberately blind to the commonest and most generally accepted military principles, and they have been misled by the general success or good luck which has attended us in most of our wars. The awful sacrifice of life and money which we had to undergo during the four years in order to train our Civil War veterans and to produce that army is entirely forgotten, and the country is lulled into utterly unfounded assurance that a volunteer enlisted to-day, or a militiaman enrolled to-morrow, can in a week or a month be made an effective soldier. More than this, the fact that in the Civil War each side labored under the burden of having to use raw levies at first, while in any foreign war we might have, our troops would have to encounter at once a trained and disciplined force, is entirely ignored. The people of this country and the government of this country, down to the time of the Spanish War, had pursued a policy which seemed utterly to ignore the lessons of the past. It thus has happened that instead of an intelligent economy, a short-sighted parsimony has been too often practised in respect to the army. After the emergency arises, and when it is too late for economical preparation, then the legislature opens the treasury by appropriations and provisions of the greatest liberality to meet the necessi-

ties which only time and thorough preparation could properly and economically meet.

I hope that we may never have another war. But our experience in the past does not justify such a hope. It is our duty, therefore, if we would be wise in our generation, to make provision for a comparatively small regular army and efficient reserve of volunteers, and an adequate and co-operating force of State militia. The necessity of these measures at the present time, as well as the blunders and financial short-sightedness which have characterized our military policy in the past, are clearly shown by Mr. Huidekoper.

Without concurring in all of his judgments, I can truly say that his article deserves the most careful reading and consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. M. Lapham." The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a period at the end.

REVIEWS.

ARMY AND NAVY REGISTER

WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 24, 1906.

OUR MILITARY DEFICIENCY.

THERE is a visible shock to the optimistic mind in two articles contained in the current number of *THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*. One of these papers bears the title "Our Navy," and is a tribute by "An American Citizen," behind which indefinite descriptive designation the author seeks to show that the naval personnel is in a bad way generally. In discussions of this sort a critic gains attention and respect and exercises influence in the measure of his sincerity, real or apparent. The first step toward establishing that quality is an identity of authorship, and an article which comes from no more exclusive source of information than "An American Citizen" must be passed by as being of doubtful value as a contribution to the fund of information to mankind, or as lacking in anything virtuous, because the author dares not to come out in the open and conduct his warfare. The attack from ambush does not occupy a very exalted place in military strategy.

The other article, being the second installment of Mr. Frederic Louis Huidekoper's paper, "Is the United States Prepared for War?" is of a quite different sort. It is a statistical interrogation, of which it is well worth seeking the answer in the practical preparation for the emergency that Mr. Huidekoper feels we have placidly ignored. In the present paper that able writer gives specific instances of the uncertainty of militia as an ally of the regular military force in time of war, and his citations are impressive, if not positively sensational. He points out the defects which exist in the present militia law, and shows that the country

is able to gain nothing from the legislative provision of a volunteer reserve, which alone would be of use in time of war, the organized militia being limited to service within the United States for a period not to exceed nine months.

Mr. Huidekoper shows, too, that we could safely count upon only 144,525 troops for war, one-third of which would be drawn from the "untrained militia, which could not stand against the regulars of such countries as France or Germany." With the 100,000 dependable troops very little could be accomplished against the war strength of the armies of Austria or France or Germany or Russia or Great Britain or even Japan. "How long," asks Mr. Huidekoper, "could our army cope with the 800,000 veterans Japan was known to have had in Manchuria?"

This passage in Mr. Huidekoper's article ought to appeal to Congress while it still has under consideration the provision of the means of sustaining and supporting an adequate and properly equipped military personnel: "Although one is fully ready to grant that awful blunders have often been made by the Army itself, yet, on the other hand, one cannot refrain from asking whether any set of men in whose hands reposes the power to mould the military organization and to provide all military supplies has the right—moral or otherwise—to send the flower of a country's manhood to be sacrificed on the altar of national honor? At the very best, 'war is hell;' and when our soldiers are forced to die by thousands from wounds, fever, starvation, and lack of medicines and attention, who will attempt to hold blameless the legislators who have neglected their duty? When a man dies through the neglect of another man who might have prevented his death, does not the law call this neglect by a very dire name and punish it accordingly? Is the War Department accountable because, when 200,000 trained soldiers are needed at the outbreak of war, only half that number are forthcoming? Is the War Department responsible when vast quantities of supplies and medical stores are needed, that only a fraction is provided? Is the War Department to be blamed, when experienced officers are required to lead troops and to administer the branches of the staff, and experienced surgeons to care for the sick and wounded, because ignorance and parsimony at the Capitol refuse to authorize their employment or to provide them with proper education? Are Secretaries of

War to be held at fault because they have inherited vicious systems and defective organizations which are utterly inadequate to the stress of war, when they were not responsible for the creation of them, and when the genius of a Napoleon in their place would be powerless to make the proper changes? Have not the military blunders of our legislators cost appallingly enough already? How much longer are Americans to be taxed for the military education of our legislators who will not learn?"

There is much information in these articles which Mr. Huidekoper has written, and it ought to appeal with force to those who have hitherto been insanely content to regard this country as secure against defeat in the presence of any enemy. He brings out the real situation as we shall some day doubtless know it, when it is too late to apply the remedy and when we have bought practical experience at the high price of public humiliation and needless loss of life. Looking at the situation in an almost commercial sense, which is an element introduced by Mr. Huidekoper in his several arguments in favor of a sane recognition of our danger and a timely application of a cure, it is pointed out that the true valuation of real and personal property in this country amounted, five or six years ago, to \$94,300,000,000. The maintenance of the regular army of less than 65,000 officers and men last year cost \$77,655,162.80, which, as Mr. Huidekoper says, "considered from the standpoint of insurance alone, is only 0.83 mills on the dollar, or 83-1000 of one per cent. on the valuation of property." An army three times the size of our present army would, it is estimated, cost less than twice the above rate, or about \$1.66 per annum on every \$1,000 of property.

Altogether, Mr. Huidekoper has rendered by this example of pessimism a real service to his country, if his article shall succeed in gaining that attention which it deserves by reason of the soundness of its logic, the succinctness of its comment, the reliability and pertinence of its statistics, and the openness and candor of its criticism.

From the
Journal of the United States Infantry Association
for April, 1906, pp. 197-198.

“IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR WAR?”

WE suggest to all our readers, indeed to all patriotic citizens, a careful study of Mr. Huidekoper's articles in the February and March numbers of *THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*, entitled “*Is the United States Prepared for War?*” They are very forceful and timely. The array of figures and tables with which he supports his arguments is startling and disagreeable, and may well bid us pause a moment in our mad rush for wealth, to see what measures we have taken to protect this great horde of money from the greed of others.

Military men have had knowledge of the weaknesses in our military policy, but dared not publish the truth. Mr. Huidekoper, being a civilian and a well-known student of military history, cannot be set aside as a military optimist, and as desiring an increase in our military establishment for his own advancement. General Upton was advised by his friends not to publish his book on our military policy, as it would be distasteful to the volunteers, who were then in high places in the government; so it was not until long after his death that his valuable manuscript was unearthed and a few limited copies printed. A few of the striking statements in the article may be quoted:

“*Never at the beginning of any decade in our national history, save one, have our people had as many as one trained soldier to every one thousand of population to protect them.*” Tables to support this. “*That the militia and volunteers have never failed after two years of war—which afford ample time to transform them into well-trained soldiers—to acquit themselves with the utmost credit in no wise alters the fact that until they have undergone some similar schooling they have never been and never will be anything but comparatively raw, undisciplined organizations.*”

For the class of fatuous patriots who believes that he is a predestined hero and a field marshal by birth, such sentences are hard reading.

Washington wrote, September 24, 1776: “*To place any depend-*

ence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff." Then follows a table showing where and when the "*Militia Ran Away or Deserted*" from August 27, 1776, to Bull Run; next is a table showing when and where "*The Militia Mutinied*"—and last of all is the most serious table, showing when "*The States Defied the United States Government by Refusing to Furnish Their Militia to Its Service*," which is the weakest link in our government. We cannot make war as a nation unless the States consent and willingly furnish their quotas.

He draws a parallel between the glorious victories of the navy, from the days of John Paul Jones down to the present, and the disgraceful defeats of the army during the same period, and attributes the difference to the fact "*that Congress has been wise enough to hold jealously to its constitutional right 'to provide and maintain a navy,' instead of delegating any part thereof to the various States and giving them the power to interfere in naval as they can in military affairs. Furthermore, the appointment of all naval officers is vested in the President alone, and not given to the Governors of the States, as in the case of the militia volunteers.*" He might have added that although all of our Presidents in the past have believed that lawyers, doctors, farmers, could readily command divisions and army corps, they have not yet learned that such men can command a line of battleships; when that doubt is removed from a President's mind the navy's long chain of victories may be roughly broken.

"*It must be borne in mind that we have never yet been pitted against the land forces of any first-class military power;*" and yet how many of our children are taught in school that twice we took the British Lion by the tail, thrashed his head against the rocks, and left him dead forever? We would have taken his kingdom save for the great body of water between us. "*It is indeed a most lamentable fact that never once have our soldiers gone into a war for which Congress has made the necessary preparations beforehand.*"

He speaks of the "ignorance and parsimony" governing our military policy in peace, and the extravagance and folly of our method of conducting war. His statements are amply reinforced by quotations from historical and state papers. He illustrates again how the wisdom of Washington, Jefferson, Calhoun, and

other really great men has been sown on the wind, and intimates what we all must feel—that the whirlwind is forming.

There is so much meat in the article that it is impossible to do it justice in extracts. We simply quote enough to give our readers a desire for more. The last sentence is the heart cry of every true citizen:

“When will our American people awake to the facts, or when will our legislators heed the handwriting on the wall?”

IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR WAR? ¹

BY FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER.

WHEN Washington, in a letter to the President of Congress, dated August 20th, 1780, said that "it is an old maxim that the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war," he merely repeated in another form what had been said by Roman writers many centuries before his time. One need not be a profound student of history to be able to appreciate fully the disasters gratuitously courted by any nation which is not at all times thoroughly prepared for a final appeal to arms, or to comprehend that rampant patriotism and mere numbers of soldiers do not constitute adequate preparations for war; our own Civil War, the Franco-German War and the recent struggle between Japan and Russia are sufficient proofs. The French "Grand Army" of 1805 was one of the most perfect fighting machines that the world has yet seen. Commanded by the greatest strategist of all time, its Marshals a group of warriors whose renown has still to be equalled by any one set of corps commanders, trained by two years of incessant drill at the Armed Camp at Boulogne, imbued with unbounded enthusiasm, it is small wonder that it proved irresistible at Ulm and later at Austerlitz. Napoleon himself declared that the "Army of Austerlitz" was the finest he ever commanded, and yet one of his aides-de-camp, Count Philippe de Ségur, wrote of it:

"However, these great armies, just like *colossi*, are only good to be seen at a distance from which many of the defective details are imperceptible."

¹Leading article in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for February, 1906.

Every great general knows only too well how many imperfections must exist in the best of armies and even under the most favorable circumstances, and it was undoubtedly this knowledge which caused General Sherman to declare:

"I cannot help plead to my countrymen, at every opportunity, to cherish all that is manly and noble in the military profession, because Peace is enervating and no man is wise enough to foretell when soldiers may be in demand again."

We Americans are far too prone to boast that everything we possess is "the finest in the world," and we gloat with a pride often offensive over the marvellous achievements of our national career. Superficiality, which is a dominant American trait, has caused us to slumber under a false security, and to believe that, because we have been fortunate enough to be victorious in our past wars, we may continue to rest at ease over the future. The Monroe Doctrine, with its policy of non-interference in European affairs and its dogma that European Powers shall not meddle in the affairs of this continent, has contributed to give us a provincial standpoint from which even the Spanish-American War and our sudden development into a "World Power" have as yet been unable to deliver us entirely. Animated by the deeply rooted Anglo-Saxon repugnance to a large standing army and anything which smacks of militarism in the slightest degree, we as a people cling with astonishing tenacity to the ridiculous fallacy that a citizen with a musket is fully equal, if not superior, to the trained soldier both in courage and efficiency. That we have thus far weathered the storms which the American Ship of State has encountered seems to us to be ample reason why we should content ourselves with the course that we have steered in the past, utterly oblivious to the fact that we have apparently forgotten the lessons which we ought to have learned, and that in every respect, except as concerns our army, we Americans have never been satisfied to follow, but have striven, and in most cases succeeded in our desire, to lead the rest of the world.

We pride ourselves that we are a peaceful people which does not voluntarily plunge into war; yet our history demonstrates that, since the signing of the Declaration of Independence, for

every four and a half years of peace we have had one year of war. The United States has never, thus far, been pitted against the land forces of a first-class military Power; England, although the leading naval Power of the world since the sixteenth century, was not a first-class military Power in 1775-1783, and the blunders of her Sovereign and Cabinet afforded singular aid to the revolting colonies; even in 1812-1815, she had scarcely attained the front rank, and she was, moreover, so involved in her struggle against Napoleon that her Peninsular veterans could not be sent across the ocean until the close of the war, and consequently only participated in the battle of New Orleans, which was fought after peace had been signed.

The military establishment of the United States has always consisted of three branches: (1) The Regular Army; (2) The Militia; and (3) The Volunteers. Thanks to the parsimony and short-sightedness of Congress, our Regular Army has invariably been much too small to meet our requirements in time of war—and, indeed, often in time of peace—so that it has always been necessary to depend largely upon the Militia and Volunteers. “Why not?” the opinionated American will reply with characteristic superficiality. “Have we not always had plenty of them at our disposal? And, surely, you cannot ask for better troops than these same Militia and Volunteers were at the close of the Civil War.” Granting that it would be impossible to find in military annals more splendid troops than those which the United States possessed in 1865, we must not forget that they were then militia and volunteers in name only. Four years of desperate fighting had transformed them from extremely raw recruits into seasoned veterans of the very highest type.

We have achieved our phenomenal successes by the application of sound business foresight and judgment and progressive business methods to the various problems which we have undertaken to solve, and it is consequently surprising that our people have not, through their Senators and Representatives in Congress, made use of these same methods in dealing with their Army. It may accordingly be well to examine briefly what our wars have cost us in men and money, and why so little has been learned from the lessons which the past ought to have taught us. We may begin by scrutinizing the following table:

War.	Regulars.	Militia, etc.	Opponents.	Cost.	Pensions.
Revolution....	231,771 ¹	164,087 ²	Ab't 150,605 ³	\$370,000,000 ⁴	\$70,000,000 ⁵
1812.....	56,032 ⁶	471,622 ⁶	Ab't 55,000 ⁷	82,627,009 ⁸	45,542,069 ⁶
Creek.....	600 ⁹	43,921 ¹⁰	1,500-2,000 ¹¹	Unestimated	See below
Seminole.....	5,911 ¹²	1,600 ¹²	Ab't 1,000 ¹³	8,004,236 ⁸	See below
Black Hawk....	1,341 ¹⁴	4,638 ¹⁴	800-1,000 ¹⁵	5,446,034 ⁸	See below
Florida ¹⁶	20,632 ¹⁷	48,152 ¹⁸	1,200-2,000 ¹⁹	69,751,611 ⁸	Footnote ²⁰
Mexican.....	31,024 ²¹	73,532 ²²	Ab't 46,000 ²³	88,500,208 ⁸	38,059,245 ⁶
Civil.....	67,000 ²⁴	2,605,341 ²⁵	1,000,000 ²⁶	5,371,079,748 ²⁷	3,259,195,306 ⁶
Spanish.....	58,688 ²⁸	223,235 ²⁹	200,000 ³⁰	321,833,254 ³¹	{ 15,438,355 ⁶
Philippine.....	76,416 ³²	50,052 ³²	Unestimated	171,326,572 ³³	

Probably not one American in a hundred thousand has any conception of the outrageous extravagance in men and money that has characterized every war in which we have been involved. From a purely business standpoint, the above figures are indicative of puerile short-sightedness and criminal blundering, such as would not be tolerated for a moment in any properly managed company or corporation in the United States. One example drawn from Upton will suffice to demonstrate how needlessly

¹General Emory Upton, "The Military Policy of the United States," p. 58. This was published by the War Department in 1904, and is the most trustworthy work on the subject ever written. Owing to lack of appropriation, it is now out of print.—²Returns and estimates of the Secretary of War; American State Papers, Vol. I, pp. 14-19.—³Original returns in the British Record Office, quoted by H. B. Carrington, "Battles of the American Revolution," pp. 93, 301, 321, 462, 483, 502 and 646.—⁴Upton, p. 66; Ingersoll, "The Second War," I, p. 14.—⁵Annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30th, 1906, p. 11.—⁶Records of the Adjutant-General's Office. Also Upton, p. 137.—⁷Brannan's Letters and Gleig's British Campaigns, quoted by Upton, p. 138. To the above number must be added 1,810 militia and 9,825 Indians.—⁸Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30th, 1906, p. 100. Also Upton, p. 141.—⁹39th U. S. Infantry.—¹⁰According to the records of the Adjutant-General's Office, Georgia, Tennessee and Mississippi furnished 25,779 and North and South Carolina 18,142 militia. Of these only 15,000 were actually put into the field.—¹¹Upton, p. 119.—¹²Upton, p. 149.—¹³Report of the Senate Investigating Committee; American State Papers, I, pp. 739-741.—¹⁴Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.—¹⁵Report of Major-General Macomb, commanding the Army, Nov., 1832; American State Papers, V, pp. 29-31.—¹⁶Including the Florida War, 1835 to 1842; the Creek War, 1836 to 1838; and the Cherokee War, 1836 to 1838.—¹⁷Upton, p. 190.—¹⁸Records of the Adjutant-General's Office.—¹⁹General Call's report to the President, Jan. 9th, 1836; American State Papers, VII, p. 218.—²⁰The annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions, June 30th, 1906, p. 11, gives the total pensions paid out for the Indian Wars as amounting to \$8,260,143.38.—²¹Upton, p. 221.—²²*Ibid.*, p. 216.—²³Alphabetical List of Battles, 1754-1900, pp. 236-237. Compiled from official records by Newton A. Strait.—²⁴Phisterer, Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States (Campaigns of the Civil War Series), p. 11.—²⁵Official Records in the Office of the Military Secretary; Memorandum relative to the probable number of and ages of Army and Navy survivors of the Civil War, p. 4 (published

extravagant we have been, considering how disproportionately small have been the results achieved:

"The troops called out during this fruitless campaign [1814] numbered: Regulars, 38,186; Militia, 197,653; total, 235,839.

"Of the militia 46,469 from the State of New York were employed on the Canadian frontier, while *more than 100,000 from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia were called out to repel the incursion of the 3,500 British along the shores of the Chesapeake.*

"Notwithstanding these enormous drafts, *such were the faults of our organization and recruitments, that the utmost strength we could put forth on the field of battle was represented at Lundy's Lane by less than 3,000 men.* Nor was this evidence of national weakness our only cause of reproach. *Boasting at the outset of the contest that Canada could be 'captured without soldiers, and that a few volunteers and militia could do the business,' our statesmen, after nearly three years of war, had the humiliation of seeing their plan of conquest vanish in the smoke of a burning capital."*

The lamentable policy of retrenchment in time of peace, to which our legislators have invariably adhered, is nothing less than the "penny wise, pound foolish" policy which every sane business man heartily condemns. The results entailed by this false

by the Military Secretary's Office, May 15th, 1905); Reply of the Military Secretary, dated Aug. 28th, 1905, to the writer's letter of inquiry. The total number of soldiers, both regular and volunteer, was 2,672,341.—²⁶Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV, p. 768. The numbers employed by the Confederacy have been variously estimated from 700,000 to 1,500,000. Livermore, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America," p. 63, reckons the numbers between 1,227,890 and 1,406,180. These calculations are at best conjectural since, as the Military Secretary wrote, on August 28th, 1905, to the author of this article: "No compilation has ever been prepared by this [the War] Department from which even an approximately accurate statement can be made concerning the number of troops in the Confederate Army, and it is impracticable to make such a compilation because of the incompleteness of the collection of Confederate records in possession of the Department."—²⁷Senate Executive Document No. 206, Forty-sixth Congress, Second Session. Letter of John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, to Hon. William A. Wheeler, President of the Senate, June 10th, 1880, transmitting a statement of "Expenditures necessarily growing out of the War of the Rebellion, July 1st, 1861, to June 30th, 1879," a total of not less than \$6,189,929,908.58.—²⁸Report of the Adjutant-General, Nov. 1st, 1898, in the report of the Secretary of War for 1898, pp. 145, 147 and 260.—²⁹Statistical Exhibit of the Strength of the Volunteer Forces called into service during the War with Spain, issued by the Adjutant-General, Dec. 13th, 1899. Also Strait, pp. 208-209.—³⁰International Year Book for 1898, p. 722; Lodge, "History of the War with Spain," p. 18.—³¹Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30th, 1906, p. 102.—³²Report of the Adjutant-General, Nov. 1st, 1898.—³³From May, 1898, to April, 1902, both inclusive, according to the statement sent to the Senate by the Secretary of War, June 19th, 1902.

economy furnish a further corroboration of the fact that our military policy has always been unsound from a financial as well as a numerical standpoint, as will appear from the following table:

COST OF U. S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BY PERIODS.

Period.	Condition.	Cost.
1791-1811 ¹	Peace	\$35,669,930 65
1812-1816	Including the War of 1812	82,627,009 14
1817-1835	Minor Indian Wars. Army averaging under 6,000 officers and men.....	90,411,068 59
1836-1843	Florida War.....	69,751,611 50
1843-1845	Peace. Army reduced.....	13,873,146 89
1846-1849	Including the Mexican War.....	88,500,208 38
1850-1860	Peace. Army reduced.....	168,079,707 57
1861-1865	Including the Civil War.....	2,736,570,923 50
1866-1869	Forces large, because of French occupation of Mexico.....	583,749,510 99 ²
1870-1897	Peace. Army reduced.....	1,211,321,300 94
1898-1899	Including Spanish-American War.....	321,833,254 76
1900-1902	Including Philippine War.....	391,662,681 06
1903-1906	Peace	473,776,697 34
Total cost since 1790.....		\$6,267,827,081 31 ³
Total cost of pensions since 1790.....		\$3,500,220,462 79

What do American taxpayers who have had to foot some of these bills think of these figures? How long do they suppose that the stockholders in any bank or railway company would tolerate any such mismanagement? How long would the officials or directors be permitted to remain in power if they could produce no better results in return for such enormous expenditures? The mere expense of maintaining armaments, however costly, is by no means the only item to be considered in war; the outpouring of men to meet the call to arms, the disturbance of all business, economic and political conditions are additional factors which must not be disregarded. When one considers that sacrifices involving pecuniary loss to every individual have always been willingly met, and that our military forces have nearly always been disgracefully beaten at the beginning of every war, save one, it is indeed a veritable enigma that the nation has not long ago awakened to the mismanagement of its affairs and risen in anger against the indignities to which it has been subjected by its own servants.

¹Throughout this table the dates given are "both inclusive" in each instance.—²Including outstanding warrants amounting to \$3,621,780.07.—

³Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, June 30th, 1906, pp. 100 and 102.

It may be worth while to examine briefly the military history of the United States, taking care, as Upton warns us,

“to bear in mind the respective duties and responsibilities of soldiers and statesmen. The latter are responsible for the creation and organization of our resources, and, as in the case of the President, may further be responsible for their management or mismanagement. Soldiers, while they should suggest and be consulted on all the details of organization under our system, can alone be held responsible for the control and direction of our armies in the field.”

In a speech made to both Houses of Congress on December 3d, 1793, Washington said:

“I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfilment of our duties to the rest of the world without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defence, and of exacting from them the fulfilment of their duties toward us. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. *There is a rank due to these United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.*”

This dictum is applicable with equal force to every nation and every era. Why did the United States not attain the front rank among the nations of the world until the autumn of 1898? There is only one answer: because at no time in its national career, except at the end of the Civil War, was it capable of showing itself fully prepared to repel insult by force of arms at a moment's notice.

The errors committed during the Revolutionary War are thus vividly told in a letter written on August 20th, 1780, by Washington to the President of Congress:

“To one who has been a witness of the evils brought upon us by short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond description, and a crowd of motives press themselves to dictate a change. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line are to be attributed to this cause.

“Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline,

we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been, the greatest part of the war, inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause.

“Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expense of the war and the paper emissions have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had a great part of the time two sets of men to feed and pay—the discharged men going home, and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present lines we find that there are some who have received \$150 in specie for five months’ service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that, by the time they have taught these men the rudiments of a soldier’s duty, their services will have expired and the work recommenced with a new set. The consumption of provisions, arms, accoutrements and stores of every kind has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours, order and economy have been impracticable. No person who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs can doubt that our currency has depreciated with-

out comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments than it would have done otherwise.

"There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. *Had we kept a permanent army on foot the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since.*

"If the army is left in the present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put upon a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect, and nothing, I believe, will tend more to give us peace the coming winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favorable terms in forceable language; an army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied and crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim, that *the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war.*"

From a military point of view the errors of the Revolutionary War may be summed up under ten headings, viz.:

(1) Enlisting of volunteers for too short periods of service; (2) entirely too great a dependence placed upon the militia; (3) substituting or increasing the armies in the field by new and untrained organizations, instead of keeping the former up to their full strength; (4) pernicious use of bounties, both State and National—the logical result of short enlistments and dearth of proper provisions for recruiting; (5) depriving organizations of their officers by detailing them on detached duty, owing to the failure to provide the requisite number of officers for staff duty, recruiting, etc.; (6) final expedient of drafting troops; (7) enormously increased expense caused by the unnecessarily large number of troops under pay, the wanton waste resulting from lack of discipline and the heavy losses from sickness which is inevitable among raw troops; (8) needless protraction of the war, owing to the inefficiency of the troops employed; (9) absolute lack of definite policy by Congress at any time during the war—consequent inability of the commander-in-chief to frame any sound plan of campaign, and the necessity of resorting to inadequate and costly makeshifts; and (10) unnecessary increase in the pension list.

Let us now examine briefly the laws enacted by our sage legislators, and see how much profit they have derived from these awful lessons which so nearly lost us our independence.

In the midst of the most critical period in the history of the

United States, when the national credit at home and abroad was completely exhausted, and when the country was rapidly drifting into a state of anarchy, Congress on June 2d, 1784, resolved:

"That the commanding officer be, and he is hereby, directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, *except twenty-five privates* to guard the stores at Fort Pitt and *fifty-five* to guard the stores at West Point, and other magazines, *with a proportionate number of officers*; no officer to remain in service above the rank of captain, and those privates to be retained who were enlisted on the best terms: *Provided*, That Congress before its recess shall not take other measures respecting the disposition of those troops."

On the very next day, totally ignoring the disasters occasioned by employing raw levies during the Revolution, Congress passed the following measure:

"Whereas a body of troops to consist of 700 non-commissioned officers and privates, properly officered, are immediately and indispensably necessary for securing and protecting the Northwestern frontiers of the United States, and their Indian friends and allies, and for garrisoning the posts soon to be evacuated by the troops of His Britannic Majesty:

"*Resolved*, That it be, and it is hereby recommended to the States hereafter named, and as most conveniently situated, to furnish forthwith from their militia 700 men, to serve for twelve months unless sooner discharged, in the following proportions: Connecticut, 165; New York, 165; New Jersey, 110; Pennsylvania, 260; making in the whole 700:

"*Resolved*, That the Secretary of War take order for forming the said troops when assembled into one regiment to consist of eight companies of infantry and two of artillery, arming and equipping them in a soldier-like manner."

Within a year, Congress awoke to the realization that these militia were totally inadequate, and that regular troops were indispensable; accordingly, on April 1st, 1785, it resolved:

"That it is necessary that a body of troops consisting of 700 non-commissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years, unless sooner discharged, for the protection of the Northwestern frontiers, to defend the settlers on the land belonging to the United States from the depredations of the Indians and to prevent unwarranted intrusion thereon, and for guarding the public stores."

On April 7th and 12th, supplemental legislation was enacted, specifying the States which were to furnish the recruits and

defining the organization of this first regular regiment of the United States Army (the present 3d Infantry).

Shay's rebellion (December, 1786) which seriously imperilled the Government arsenal at Springfield, Mass., coupled with a desire to "save the great expense of transporting new levies to the distant frontiers" and "to avail the public of the discipline and knowledge of the country" acquired by the Regulars raised in 1785, caused Congress to offer inducements to the men to re-enlist by voting, on October 3d, 1787, "that seven hundred non-commissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years, unless sooner discharged."

In consequence of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution, the military as well as the civil affairs required overhauling, and a War Department was created by the law of August 7th, 1789. The Act of September 29th laid the foundations of our present Army by recognizing "the establishment for the troops in the service of the United States," by requiring all officers and men to take an oath of allegiance, and by vesting the power to appoint officers in the President alone. By virtue of the 5th section the President was authorized, whenever it might be necessary to protect the frontiers against the Indians, to call into service such militia as he should deem requisite, such militia when in service to have the same pay and subsistence as the Regulars.

The first general organization of the Army under the Constitution was effected by the Act of April 30th, 1790, which fixed the strength of the regular establishment at one regiment of infantry and one battalion of artillery, numbering respectively 962 and 321 officers and men. General Harmar's expedition against the Miamis again demonstrated the folly of depending upon newly formed militia, and forced Congress to add another regiment of Regulars to be enlisted for three years. By virtue of the 8th section of this Act of March 3d, 1791, the President was empowered to employ, "for a term not exceeding six months," a corps of 2,000 non-commissioned officers, privates and musicians in addition to, or in place of, the militia, and, if such a corps should not be raised in time for active operations, to make good the deficiency by raising additional levies or by calling into service an equal number of militia; while the 9th section author-

ized him "to organize the said levies, and alone to appoint the commissioned officers thereof, in the manner he may judge proper." As Upton remarks:

"The above legislation merits our closest scrutiny. Here was laid the foundation of the volunteer system, which attained its fullest development during our long Civil War. The 'levies,' known later as 'volunteers,' were authorized under the plenary power of Congress to 'raise and support armies,' and the power of appointing their officers was given the President, to whom it obviously belonged, as the 'levies' were wholly distinct from the militia or State troops.

"The subsequent transfer of this power from the President to the Governors of the States was a voluntary return to the practice under the Confederation and a surrender of the prerogatives of the General Government under the Constitution."

The disastrous rout of General St. Clair's expedition by the Indians caused Congress to increase the strength of the Army to 258 officers and 5,414 men, by the Act of March 5th, 1792. For the succeeding twenty years the legislative enactments, depending largely upon our foreign relations and upon the troubles with the Indians, caused the force of the Regular Army to vary greatly, as will be seen from the following table:

STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY AS AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS.¹

Date.	Officers.	Men.	Total.
1796 to 1798.....	233	3,126	3,359
1798	783	13,638	14,421
1799	2,447	49,244	51,691
1800 to 1801.....	318	4,118	4,436
1802 to 1808.....	241	3,046	3,287
1808 to 1812.....	774	9,147	9,921

During this entire period, by far the most important measure was the Act of March 16th, 1802, in which the repeated urgings of Washington, Hamilton, Knox and Pickering were heeded by the establishment of a Military Academy at West Point; and only second in importance to the above law, was the Act of March 2d, 1799, the provisions of which would unquestionably have prevented most of our subsequent disasters had they only been re-

¹F. B. Heitman, "Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, 1789 to 1903," II, p. 626. This work was compiled from official sources. The actual strength of the Army was naturally always less than the authorized strength.

tained in force. From 1802 to 1808, all Congressional measures, whether offensive or defensive, were directed toward the almost exclusive use of the militia and volunteers. Notwithstanding that a quarrel with England had been brewing since 1807, and by 1810 was recognized to be unavoidable, Congress was so culpably negligent of the urgent needs of the nation for additional protection that, in July, 1812, the Army did not actually exceed 6,686 officers and men, short enlistments were again resorted to and the outbreak of war found the entire military establishment in the utmost chaos. The fruits of the vicious military policy which had been so persistently followed by Congress were reaped in a succession of failures, defeats and disgraces, culminating with the burning of Washington, which are still an indelible blot upon our national history, and few of us realize that, in spite of our employment of nearly half a million militia and volunteers, *"the only decisive victory of the War of 1812 before the conclusion of the treaty of peace was at the battle of the Thames, where the force of the British regulars dispersed and captured numbered but little more than 800."*

In 1814, the Army numbered on paper 62,674 officers and men, whereas its actual strength in September of that year was only 38,186, and the succession of disasters caused desertion to such an extent that by February, 1815, it had dwindled to 33,424. At the close of the war, the policy of retrenchment was again resorted to, and by the Act of March 3d, 1815, the Army was reduced to 10,024. The Act of April 24th, 1816, important as it was in many respects, did not affect the strength of the Army which fell off until it reached a minimum of 5,211 in 1822, by virtue of the Act of March 2d, 1821, which reduced its paper strength of 12,664 to 6,183. The actual force of Regulars did not vary 2,000 from that number for seventeen years until the complications with Great Britain caused Congress to increase it to 12,539 by the Acts of July 5th and 7th, 1838, although the maximum actual strength of 11,169 was not attained until November, 1841. On August 23d, 1842, only nine days after the official announcement of the termination of hostilities in the Florida War, Congress lost no time in reducing the Army to 8,613, which constituted approximately its strength until the outbreak of the Mexican War on May 11th, 1846. Within the next ten months

and by virtue of seven Acts of Congress, the military establishment was increased on paper to 30,865—although its actual numbers in November, 1847, did not exceed 21,686; but the very month after the ratification of the treaty of peace had been proclaimed, it was forthwith reduced to 10,317 (Act of August 14th, 1848), remaining within 1,000 of this number until November, 1854. The hostility of the Indians caused the President to avail himself of the authority given him by the Act of June 17th, 1850, and to order the companies west of the Mississippi to be recruited up to their full complement; this order, in conjunction with the Act of March 3d, 1855, gave the Army an actual force of 15,752 officers and men, from which it did not vary 1,800 until the outbreak of the Civil War.

Throughout the entire period from 1802 to 1860 and notwithstanding the lessons of the Revolution, which each succeeding war demonstrated anew, Congress persisted, whenever hostilities were imminent or larger forces than the Regular Army were required, in confiding the destinies of the nation to a hurriedly collected militia, which, by the very nature of its composition and lack of training, was utterly unfit to cope with the situation. Added to the lack of a sound military policy displayed by our legislators in adhering to short enlistments, in increasing the armies in the field by raw organizations, in the use of bounties and in repeating all the mistakes made during the War of Independence, the incapacity of the militia obliged the Government to employ many times the number which would have amply sufficed had trained soldiers been used, needlessly prolonged wars that could have been terminated much sooner and caused expenditures which the magnitude of the operations never once justified. The Mexican War alone added real lustre to the American arms; and this may be reasonably attributed to the fact that circumstances permitted enough time to be gained at the beginning of the war to give the volunteers some much-needed training, and that the Government was wise enough to employ a larger percentage (30 per cent.) of Regular troops than in any war before or since. The value of trained forces is evinced by the fact that they achieved an unbroken chain of victories, notwithstanding that official documents prove that their successes were won "under the very same system of laws and ex-

ecutive orders which, in the preceding foreign war (1812), had led to a series of disasters culminating in the capture and destruction of our capital."

How little heed had been paid by Congress to the lessons of the past has been thus admirably summarized by Upton:

"At the close of the year 1860, we presented to the world the spectacle of a great nation nearly destitute of military force. Our territory from ocean to ocean exceeded 3,000,000 square miles; our population numbered 31,000,000.

"The Regular Army, as organized, consisted of 18,093 officers and men, but according to the returns it numbered only 16,367.

"The line of the Army was composed of 198 companies, of which 183 were stationed on the frontier or were en route to distant posts west of the Mississippi. The remaining 15 companies were stationed along the Canadian frontier and on the Atlantic coast from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico.

"As a guard for the national frontiers, the Army could not furnish two soldiers per mile; for protecting the settlements in the States and Territories west of the Mississippi but one soldier was available for every 120 square miles; to aid in the enforcement of the laws in the remaining States of the Union we had but one soldier for every 1,300 square miles.

"The militia for a sudden emergency were scarcely more available than the Army. Nominally they numbered more than 3,000,000, but mostly unorganized. So destitute were they of instruction and training that—a few regiments in the large cities excepted—they did not merit the name of military force.

"Such was the condition of the national defence when, on the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina in convention passed the ordinance of secession."

It is beyond the scope of this article to describe *in extenso* all the errors committed during the Civil War. Suffice it to say that, for want of a Regular Army of sufficient size and expansiveness, or a proper force of trained militia capable of crushing the Confederacy at its inception, recourse had to be had to raw troops, in which the President and his Cabinet showed at the outset the same blind confidence which their predecessors had manifested in 1812. The logical result followed; these undisciplined volunteers ran away in a most disgraceful manner at the first battle of Bull Run, and the opening year of the war was marked by an almost unbroken chain of disasters, in spite of the fact that the Government called out no less than 807,557 troops—669,243 of which responded—at a cost of more than

\$238,000,000. Oblivious to the lessons of preceding wars, the folly of short enlistments was again committed, the Constitution had to be violated in order to meet the sudden emergency, the armies in the field were reinforced by new and untrained regiments, which, through ignorance and lack of discipline, suffered from unnecessary sickness, causing at the same time criminal waste and expense. Large bounties and even forced drafting had to be resorted to within two years and, lastly, no definite military policy worthy of the name was followed until General Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief. In a word, all the errors of the Revolution were repeated *ad nauseam*. Blunder after blunder was committed by volunteer officers whose ignorance was only excelled by their courage, yet Congress never permitted the Regular Army to be increased beyond a paper strength of 39,273 officers and men (Acts of July 29th and August 3d, 1861). This dearth of properly trained soldiers at the beginning of hostilities caused the war to be needlessly prolonged for four years; and, indeed, it is highly doubtful if it would have been brought to a successful termination even then had it not been for the iron circle of blockade which the Navy drew around the coasts of the Confederacy. At the close of the war, the volunteers had acquired a training which made them comparable to any armies that have ever existed, but at what an awful cost; more than 2,600,000 had had to be called into service, the United States Government spent no less than \$5,775,910,672.78, and the pensions paid out for this war alone have amounted to the fabulous sum of \$3,259,195,306.60. On March 31st, 1862—nearly one year after the outbreak of the war—the United States had in service an army of 637,126 regulars and volunteers, whereas the Confederacy possessed only 200,000 and nevertheless was unsubdued. The difference between the respective policies has been thus admirably epitomized by Upton:

“The Government sought to save the Union by fighting as a Confederacy; the Confederates sought to destroy it by fighting as a nation. The Government recognized the States, appealed to them for troops, adhered to voluntary enlistments, gave the Governors power to appoint all commissioned officers and encouraged them to organize new regiments. The Confederates abandoned State sovereignty, appealed directly to the people, took away from them the power to appoint commissioned officers, vested their appointment in the Confederate President, refused to organize war

regiments, abandoned voluntary enlistments, and, adopting the republican principle that every citizen owes his country military service, called into the army every white man between the ages of 18 and 35."

When the Confederacy was at last crushed and the great armies of veteran volunteers had been disbanded, the disturbed condition of the South and the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by the French invasion of Mexico compelled Congress to increase the Regular Army to 54,641 by the Act of July 28th, 1866; but, three years later, when the French Government had withdrawn its forces, the Army was reduced to 37,313 by the Act of March 3d, 1869. A succession of Acts, culminating in that of June 26th, 1876, effected a further reduction to 27,472 officers and men, the maximum of enlisted men being definitely fixed at 25,000 by the Act of June 16th, 1874. For the following twenty-two years, the actual strength of the military establishment never exceeded 28,000, until the Act of March 8th, 1898, added two regiments of artillery, thus bringing its number up to 28,747 on paper. In spite of all the lessons of the past, we have seen, as Captain Rhodes points out in his admirable Gold Medal Prize Essay of the Military Service Institution for 1904, that:

"The war with Spain, declared from the 21st of April, 1898, found us with the smallest Regular Army, in proportion to population, that we have had at the beginning of any of our wars. It consisted of but 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, *or less than four-tenths of one per cent. of our estimated population.*"

Although Congress, by the Act of April 26th, 1898, authorized an increase of the Regular Army to 64,719, the actual operations necessarily began much too soon to permit this augmentation to be effected in time to meet the emergency; and, as usual, recourse was had to the militia, from which 200,000 volunteers were called out by the President's proclamations of April 22d and May 25th. As Captain Rhodes tells us:

"A not unexpected deduction from our experiences in the Mexican and Civil Wars was that the efficiency of American volunteers was to be measured by the previous training, professional zeal and soldierly discipline of their officers. The enlisted personnel has ever been of splendid natural quality, and has not varied considerably in different regiments. Trained officers have by no means been numerous.

"The Spanish War was no exception in this respect, because the same obsolete system of selection of officers was followed as in former wars, and naturally the same results followed."

The events of this war are still too vivid in the minds of all of us to require chronicling here. Congress, as usual, failed to provide the necessary supplies until the very eve of mobilization and concentration, so that some of the volunteer regiments reported for duty without arms, accoutrements, ammunition or clothing. The confusion in the various camps, the dearth of proper supplies and equipment, the lack of adequate means of transport, the wild chaos at Tampa, the criminal waste of provisions which could not be found, the bungling which marked the embarking at Tampa and the landing at Daiquiri and Siboney, the blundering conduct of the operations culminating at Santiago and the wholly unnecessary sufferings of the troops by reason of their ignorance, coupled with the paucity of medical stores, field and base hospitals, afford a spectacle of unpreparedness and incapacity of which we Americans ought to be heartily ashamed. Judged by a purely military standard, the invasion of Cuba was a trivial affair; but never in modern times has there been an expedition which contained so many elements of weakness; that it succeeded at all is, indeed, a marvel. *The disorders, demoralization and incapacity which attended the opening operations were nothing but the logical outcome of the unwillingness of Congress to prepare for war until the last possible moment, and merely demonstrated once again the utterly vicious system to which our legislators have persistently bound us, by neglecting to provide a force of thoroughly trained soldiers either large enough or elastic enough to meet the requirements of war as well as of peace, supported by a militia which has previously had sufficient training to make it, when called out as volunteers, fairly dependable against the regular forces of other nations.*

II ¹

WHEN the progressive American business man, firm, company or corporation desires to have affairs properly conducted, one rule is invariably observed, viz., men specially trained for that particular business are employed in numbers proportioned to its requirements under any and all circumstances. We all sympathize with the Israelites who had to make bricks without straw; but, in some respects, Pharaoh was no harder taskmaster than Congress has been, inasmuch as the Army is supposed to be able to cope with every possible emergency, although the requisite strength has yet to be given it. *Never at the beginning of any decade in our national history, save one, have our people had as many as one trained soldier to every one thousand of population to protect them, as will appear from the following table:*

Year.	Population of the United States.	Actual strength of the Regular Army.	Number of soldiers per 1,000 of population.
1790	3,929,214	1,273	0.324
1800	5,308,483	4,436	0.833
1810	7,239,881	9,921	1.378
1820	9,633,822	8,942	0.927
1830	12,866,020	5,951	0.462
1840	17,069,453	10,570	0.602
1850	23,191,876	10,763	0.421
1860	31,443,321	16,367	0.520
1870	38,558,371	37,075	0.963
1880	50,155,783	26,509	0.527
1890	62,947,714	27,095	0.430
1900	76,303,387	68,155	0.895

When any individual or combination of individuals strives for the acquisition or control of a valuable business advantage or has any important negotiation to transact, the most experienced and best trained of its officials or agents are invariably selected for the work. *Per contra*, Congress has persistently neglected its best trained forces in favor of comparatively raw and inexperienced soldiers; and, in time of crisis, it has never failed to place its main dependence on the latter. Since war is the severest test to which human forces can be subjected, the folly of this procedure has naturally been reiterated *ad nauseam*. That the Militia and

¹THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for March, 1906.

Volunteers have never failed after two years of war—which afford ample time to transform them into well-trained soldiers—to acquit themselves with the utmost credit in no wise alters the fact that, until they have undergone some similar schooling, they have never been, and never will be, anything but comparatively raw, undisciplined organizations. This was clearly pointed out by Washington, who wrote to the President of Congress on September 24th, 1776, as follows:

"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.

"Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control cannot brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of an army, without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year. . . . Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 or 100,000 in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress, they must be furnished with or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will, in my opinion, prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause."

Although it would be manifestly unjust to blame the Militia for their ignorance, when our laws have never provided them with the requisite military training, and although we must not withhold the praise which they have always richly merited whenever, as Volunteers, they have at last received sufficient schooling in actual warfare, yet it must be confessed that, as a purely military asset, their value has fallen far short of what it ought

to have been, and that their history has fully justified Washington's estimate, as the following exhibits will demonstrate:

THE MILITIA RAN AWAY OR DESERTED.

Battle.	Date.	Organization or Expedition.
Long Island.....	August 27th, 1776	Parsons' brigade. ¹
Evacuation of New York.	Sept. 15th, 1776	Brigades of Parsons and Fellows. ²
Brandywine	Sept. 11th, 1777	Sullivan's division. ³
Camden, S. C.....	Aug. 16th, 1780	Virginia and South Carolina brigades. ⁴
Guilford Court House, N. C.....	March 15th, 1781	North Carolina regiment. ⁵
Indian village near Fort Wayne, Ind.....	Oct. 22nd, 1790	Harmar's Miami expedition. ⁶
Darke County, Ohio.....	Nov. 4th, 1791	St. Clair's expedition. ⁷
Frenchtown and Raisin River, Mich.....	Jan. 18th-22nd, 1813	Winchester's column. ⁸
Sackett's Harbor.....	May 29th, 1813	Gen. Brown's command. ⁹
French Creek, N. Y.....	Nov. 1st to 5th, 1813	Gen. Hampton's column. ¹⁰
Chrystler's Field, Canada	Nov. 11th, 1813	Gen. Wilkinson's column. ¹¹
Evacuation of Fort George, Niagara River.	Dec. 10th, 1813	Gen. McClure's N. Y. militia. ¹²
Burning of Buffalo, and Black Rock, N. Y.....	Dec. 30th, 1813	Gen. McClure's N. Y. militia. ¹³
Bladensburg, Md.....	Aug. 24th, 1814	Maryland, Virginia and District of Columbia Militia and Volunteers under Gen. Winder. ¹⁴
New Orleans, La.....	Jan. 8th, 1815	800 militia, under Gen. Morgan, posted on the west bank of the Mississippi. ¹⁵
Lake Okeechobee, Fla...	Dec. 25th, 1837	Missouri volunteers and spies. ¹⁶
Bull Run, Virginia.....	July 21st, 1861	Gen. McDowell's entire force of militia. ¹⁷

¹Carrington, "Battles of the American Revolution," p. 209.—²Washington's letter to the President of Congress, Sept. 16th, 1776. Sparks, IV, p. 94.—³Greene's report; Sullivan's communication to Congress; Sparks, V, Appendix, p. 462; Carrington, pp. 370-380.—⁴Gen. Henry Lee, "Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States," I, pp. 178-185; Tarleton's "Campaign in North Carolina," pp. 106-109. In contrast to their comrades, the North Carolinians of Dixon's regiment greatly distinguished themselves.—⁵Carrington, 556-562.—⁶Report of the Court of Inquiry. Upton, p. 77.—⁷Report of the Investigating Committee of the House of Representatives.—⁸Upton, p. 109.—⁹Gen. J. Brown's Re-

THE MILITIA MUTINIED.

Place.	Date.	Mutineers.
Morristown, N. J.....	Jan. 1st, 1781	Pennsylvania Line (6 regiments) 1,300 men. ¹⁸
Pompton, N. J.....	Jan. 24th-28th, 1781	New Jersey Line. ¹⁹
Lancaster, Pa.....	June, 1783	80 recruits, joined by 200 other malcontents, marched to Philadelphia, demanded their pay and held Congress prisoner for several hours on June 21st, 1783. ²⁰
On the march from Urbana, Ohio, to Detroit, Mich.	June, 1812	General Hull's militia. ²¹
Detroit, Mich.....	July, 1812	180 Ohio Militia of Hull's command. ²²
On the march from Fort Harrison, Ind., to the Wabash and Illinois Rivers	Oct. 19th, 1812	4,000 Kentucky mounted militia under General Hopkins. ²³
<i>En route</i> to the rapids of the Maumee River....	Oct., 1812	Kentucky, Virginia and Ohio Militia under Gen. W. H. Harrison. ²⁴
<i>En route</i> from Plattsburg, N. Y., to Canada.	Nov., 1812	Nearly all the 3,000 militia under General Dearborn. ²⁵
Battle of Queenstown...	Oct. 13th, 1813	New York Militia under Generals Van Rensselaer and Wadsworth. ²⁶
Fort Strother, Fla.....	Nov., 1813	Tennessee Militia and Volunteers. ²⁷
Retreat to Buffalo after evacuation of Fort George	Dec., 1813	General McClure's New York Militia. ²⁸
Withlacoochee River, Fla.	Dec. 31st, 1835	Florida Militia and Volunteers under Gov. Call. Clinch's expedition. ²⁹
Charlestown, W. Va.....	July 16th-18th, 1861	Militia of the Army of the Shenandoah. ³⁰

port to the Secretary of War, June 1st, 1813; Fay's Collection of Official Accounts . . . of all the Battles . . . during the Years 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815, pp. 101-103.—¹⁰Report of Col. Purdy, 4th New York Militia; American State Papers, I, pp. 479-480.—¹¹Upton, p. 113.—¹²Report of Gen. McClure to the Secretary of War; American State Papers, I, pp. 486-487.—¹³Letter of General Cass to the Secretary of War, Jan. 12th, 1814; American State

THE STATES DEFY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT BY REFUSING
TO FURNISH THEIR MILITIA TO ITS SERVICE.

State.	Governor.	Date.	Cause and reason for refusal.
Massachusetts	Strong	April, 1812	Denied right of President or Congress to determine when such exigencies arise as to require calling out of militia. Claimed that "this right is vested in the commanders-in-chief of the militia of the several States." ³¹
Connecticut ...	Griswold	April, 1812	Substantially the same contention as the above. ³²
Vermont	Chittenden	Nov. 10th, 1813	Declared that "the military strength and resources of this State must be reserved for its own defence and protection exclusively." ³³
Vermont	Chittenden	Sept., 1814	Refused to order militia to support Gen. Macomb in repelling the enemy. ³⁴
Virginia	Letcher	April, 1861	Rebellion.
No. Carolina..	Ellis		
Kentucky	Magoffin		
Tennessee	Harris		
Missouri	Jackson		
Arkansas	Rector		

Papers, I, pp. 487-488.—¹⁴American State Papers, I, pp. 524-575; Armstrong's "Notices of the War of 1812," II, p. 152.—¹⁵Parton's "Life of Andrew Jackson," II, p. 213; Goodwin's "Biography of Andrew Jackson," pp. 151-155; Upton, pp. 135-136.—¹⁶Official Report of General Zachary Taylor, Jan. 4th, 1838; American State Papers, VII, pp. 987-988. *Per contra*, Barnes' "Commonwealth of Missouri," p. 237.—¹⁷Official reports of General McDowell and Colonel Heintzelman; Moore's "Rebellion Record," II, Document I, pp. 2-7 and 25-27. The regulars alone retired in perfect order; Official Report of Major Sykes, *ibid*, pp. 24-25.—¹⁸Sparks, VII, pp. 359-387; Fiske, "American Revolution," II, pp. 240-242; Carrington, pp. 537-538.—¹⁹Fiske, II, pp. 242-243; Upton, p. 55.—²⁰"The Madison Papers," I, pp. 551-553; Sparks, VIII, pp. 455-456; Fiske, "Critical Period of American History," pp. 117-118.—²¹Hull's appeal to the public in his Memoirs of the Campaign of 1812, pp. 34-35.—²²Hull's Memoirs. On Aug. 16th, 1812, Hull's entire garrison at Detroit surrendered to the British. How much value the enemy placed on the Militia is evinced by the fact that they were allowed to return home, whereas the 320 Regulars were sent to Montreal as prisoners.—²³Upton, p. 99.—²⁴*Ibid*. Harper's "Encyclopædia of U. S. History," IV, pp. 266-267.—²⁵Ingersoll's "Second War," I, p. 101.—²⁶Van Rensselaer's "Affair of Queenstown," p. 10 and Appendix, p. 62; Armstrong's "Notices of the War of 1812," II, pp. 100-107, and Appendix No. 12, pp. 207-219.—²⁷Parton's "Life of Andrew Jackson," I,

Is not the above a glorious record for Americans to contemplate?—Americans are so prone to boasting of the prowess of their citizen-soldiers. Yet these results are by no means surprising, in view of the utter lack of a definite military policy which has always characterized the measures of the legislators who frame our military laws and mould our military organizations. In every walk of life the value of skilled labor is fully recognized, and specially trained men are invariably selected in preference to unskilled. Yet Congress has never failed to place its main dependence upon the unskilled citizen-soldier. Every schoolboy knows that no enthusiasm, however great, will win athletic victories without long weeks and even months of careful training; our sages in the Capitol have shown that they believe that, because our people individually possess courage, fortitude and self-reliance in the highest degree, they must necessarily possess the same qualities when aggregated as soldiers. At certain periods—as, for example, that just prior to the first battle of Bull Run—the measures passed demonstrated that Congress actually believed

pp. 459-462. This furnished a very amusing incident; first, the Militia mutinied and were suppressed by the Volunteers; then, the Volunteers revolted and were brought to order by the Militia.—²⁸Reports of General McClure to the Secretary of War; American State Papers, I, pp. 486-487.—²⁹Official Report of Major-General Macomb, commanding the army, to the Secretary of War, Nov., 1836, and Report of Gen. Call to Gen. Jackson, Jan. 9th, 1836; American State Papers, VI, p. 817, and VII, p. 218.—³⁰Gen. Patterson's Reports to the Adjutant-General; Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, pp. 126-127, 132, 138-139.—³¹Opinion delivered by Theophilus Parsons, Samuel Sewell and Isaac Parker, three judges of the Mass. Supreme Court; American State Papers, I, p. 324. Hart says ("Formation of the Union," p. 215) that "The general government had no means of enforcing its construction of the Constitution. It did, however, withdraw garrisons from the New England forts, leaving those States to defend themselves; and refused to send them their quota of the arms which were distributed among the States. This attitude was so well understood, that during the first few months of the war, English cruisers had orders not to capture vessels owned in New England. As the war advanced, these orders were withdrawn, and the territory of Massachusetts in the District of Maine was invaded by British troops. An urgent call for protection was then made upon the general government; but, even in this crisis, Massachusetts would not permit her militia to pass under the control of national military officers."—³²Upton, p. 97.—³³Ingersoll's "Second War," II, pp. 26-27; Hart, p. 215.—³⁴Ingersoll, II, p. 133. It was not until 1827 that the question was finally adjudicated in the case of *Martin vs. Mott*, when the Supreme Court of the United States decided that it was reserved to the President alone to judge when the exigency arises in which he has the constitutional right to call out the militia, and that his decision was binding. Kent's Commentaries, I, p. 279.

that an army animated by patriotism needed neither instruction nor discipline to prepare it for war.

It is a well-known maxim in business that the efficiency of the management of every firm, bank, company or corporation depends upon the capabilities of its officials. Inasmuch as the bulk of the troops which the United States has employed in time of war has always consisted of Militia and Volunteers, the officers of which, drawn from professional and mercantile pursuits, have of necessity had but little time or opportunity to master the multifarious details which ought to be familiar to every one whose duty it is to lead troops, is it surprising that their operations in war have been attended with mistakes which have often cost appallingly? Actuated by the highest motives, sacrificing their business and family interests for the purpose of serving their country, excelled by none in personal courage, these officers cannot justly be blamed for their ignorance; they are not responsible for the fact that they have never been provided with the education and training necessary to fit them to cope with the many difficult problems of war. No sound business corporation would dream for an instant of entrusting the management of its affairs to officials so comparatively inexperienced, and consequently so inferior, as the officers of the Militia and Volunteers.

It is for this very reason that the record of our land forces suffers sadly when compared with the record of our Navy, which has achieved an almost unbroken succession of splendid victories, from the days of John Paul Jones down to the present time. The education, training and *personnel* of the officers and men of the Navy being substantially on the same plane with those of their *confrères* in the Regular Army, the fundamental reason lies deeper. It rests in the fact that Congress has been wise enough to hold jealously to its constitutional right "to provide and maintain a navy," instead of delegating any part thereof to the various States and giving them the power to interfere in naval as they can in military affairs. Furthermore, the appointment of all naval officers is vested in the President alone, and not given to the Governors of the States, as in the case of the Militia and Volunteers. The consequence is that "the honor of our flag and the protection of the persons and property of our citizens have been entrusted to disciplined seamen, commanded by officers of

professional training and experience." The merits of this system over that pursued in respect to the major part of our land forces need no commentary; the results speak for themselves.

War has never been anything more or less than a prize-fight between the armed forces of opposing nations, and every man who has ever been in a fight of any sort knows the value of being able to deliver staggering blows at the outset. That incalculable advantage is conferred by the initiative in war, but that this advantage can never be maintained without a consistent course of action, supported by the requisite strength of one's armies in the field, was thoroughly taught by Napoleon, and the Japanese have been the last to demonstrate the soundness of his maxim. In order to attain these *desiderata*, the *sine qua non* always has been and always will be perfect readiness, and, other things being equal, victory has invariably attended the nation which was the more thoroughly prepared for war. Modern competition has assisted in hastening the crisis in every struggle, military, commercial or otherwise, and the first blow now follows so closely after the declaration of hostilities that no time is given for preparation, and even less for any careful study of plans for preparation. Hence it is that the nations of the world maintain military attachés and spies to watch the progress of military preparations elsewhere, in order that no other nation may be better prepared than themselves. The Scriptural parable anent the five wise and five foolish virgins is quite as applicable to modern armies as it was to the bridegroom of old.

Is the United States prepared to go to war with the military forces of the great nations in whose category we consider ourselves? We are reluctantly compelled to answer most positively, "No." The doubting Thomases will try to refute this reply by citing the fact that we possess a Regular Army numbering in time of war 100,000 troops excelled by none, and no less than 105,693 officers and men from the organized militia of the States which would serve as a second line. We retort: "Is this an adequate force? How efficient will this Militia be when called out as Volunteers?" Let us pause a moment to glance at the legislation enacted since the Spanish-American War.

Under the Act of March 2nd, 1899, United States Volunteers

were organized for service in the Philippines. Captain Rhodes says:

"As Volunteer regiments, it has been the almost unanimous verdict that they have never been surpassed. Certainly never, in such a short space of time, have such excellent troops been organized, trained and put in the field.

"If the cause of this efficiency be analyzed, it will be found to have resulted from four factors:

"(1) *In most cases the field-officers of the regiments were selected from experienced officers of the regular service; (2) the company officers were principally selected by the War Department, from officers who had served creditably in State organizations during the war with Spain; (3) the fact that from this method of selection the officers were in no way under obligations to the men under them; (4) from careful selection of the enlisted personnel, accepting only the physically perfect, and after enlistment summarily discharging those deficient in the qualifications of a good soldier.*

"Under this Act of Congress, 1,524 officers and 33,050 men were enlisted, organized, equipped and instructed, and were on their way to their destination in less than six months from the date of passage of the law. They proved themselves a thoroughly reliable force in the Philippines, and it was largely through their aid that the Philippine insurrection was checked, and relapsed into guerilla warfare."

Judged by the results obtained, this was a most admirable measure; but, unfortunately, it was limited to special conditions. On July 4th, 1902, the period of hostilities in the Philippines was officially announced to have terminated; the *raison d'être* for this force having ceased to exist, the regiments were subsequently brought back to the United States and mustered out, and the law ceased to be operative.

The next and last Congressional measure was "An Act to promote the efficiency of the Militia, and for other purposes," approved January 21st, 1903, and commonly known as "The Dick Bill." As originally introduced, it contained a number of admirable provisions; but, as in the past, it ended in a compromise measure containing some extremely glaring defects, which substantially defeated the very purpose for which the measure was framed. The merits and demerits of the bill may be summarized thus:

MERITS.

(1) Defines what citizens are liable to, and exempted from, military duty; (2) specifies the manner of calling out the Militia; (3) provides

for the issuing of arms, ammunition and other military supplies by the United States Government; (4) provides for regular inspections of the Militia by army officers detailed by the Secretary of War; (5) provides that the Militia shall participate in joint manœuvres with the Regular Army; (6) provides for the pay and allowances of the Militia participating in encampments; (7) provides for Regular officers to be present at encampments of the Militia when requested by the Governor of that State; and (8) provides for the obtaining of a list of Militia officers who have had previous training in the Regular Army, the Volunteers or National Guard, and who, upon examination by boards of Regular Army officers, have been found to possess the necessary qualifications which would fit them to hold commissions in the Volunteers.

DEMERITS.

(1) Notwithstanding the lessons of the past as to the folly of short enlistments, the bill refuses to allow the Militia to be called out for more than nine months; (2) future Volunteer regiments are to be organized according to the Act of April 22nd, 1898, thus again giving to the Governors of the various States the right to appoint the officers who are to be mustered into the service of, and receive their pay from, the United States Government; (3) appointments from the list of officers examined and found qualified to hold Volunteer commissions shall not include appointments in regiments of the organized Militia which volunteer as organizations, nor to their officers who are commissioned by the Governors of their State; (4) the original provision for the creation of a Volunteer Reserve of 100,000 men in time of peace, to which the qualified Militia officers were to be appointed, and for which the power of the Governors to make appointments in this corps had been wisely limited, was stricken out, and no provision was made for such a Volunteer Reserve, or even to keep alive the ridiculously inadequate force of 3,000 men authorized by the old Act of April 22nd, 1898.

As a result of the legislation of Congress since the Spanish-American War, the United States Government would have at its disposal in time of war:

(1) The Regular Army, with a maximum strength of 100,000 men; (2) the Organized Militia, trained as a National Guard, and limited by the Constitution to service within the United States, for a period not to exceed nine months; (3) a Volunteer Reserve, composed of such Militia organizations as would volunteer for war in a body with all their officers and men; (4) regiments of State Volunteers, commanded by officers appointed by the Governors thereof.

The troops obtainable under the above classification would number:

(1) The Regular Army, 100,000. (2) The Organized Militia according to the latest reports numbered only 105,693. This force would furnish (3) the Volunteer Reserve. Although the Military Secretary has reported that seventy-five per cent. of the Organized Militia would respond to a call for volunteers, this estimate is purely conjectural, and our last war demonstrated conclusively that not more than forty per cent. thereof could be counted upon for such service. The Volunteer Reserve would, therefore, consist only of 42,277. (4) Regiments of State Volunteers would unquestionably be found in the Volunteer Reserve. The number obtainable from this source is, accordingly, estimated as *nil*. Total number of troops upon which the United States could safely count for war is, consequently, only 142,277.

The *crux* of the entire question lies in the efficiency of the Militia or Volunteers, which can only be gauged by their training. All things considered, Pennsylvania possesses the best State Militia in the country, yet its actual training is confined to one week in camp and about seventy hours of drill and instruction during each calendar year; and, furthermore, there are no armories in the United States which permit the manœuvring of large bodies of troops such as are necessary in actual war. At the beginning of hostilities this Militia would furnish the best Volunteers that the United States could hope to obtain, and *how long does any reasonable man suppose that these troops, without additional training, would stand against the regulars of France or Germany? How much faith would the officials of any corporation place in an agent or employee whose training is limited to one week and seventy hours of work per annum? Yet this is what Congress is doing at this very moment.* Washington summed up the whole question in a nutshell when he declared that:

"Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. . . . The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence."

If war were to break out at the present time, the only troops upon which the United States could place any real dependence against the trained regulars of foreign nations would be the Regular Army—100,000 men.

Unlimited as our military resources unquestionably are, Congress has thus far failed utterly to foster and develop them, so that they may actually be a source of weakness by inviting attack. By contrast with our military resources, although undeveloped, our actual military strength is the feeblest of all the great Powers, as the following schedule will show:

Country.	Population. ¹	War Budget (in dollars).	Total war strength of army.	Peace strength of regular establishment.	Number of men in peace estab- lishment to each 1,000 of population.	Relative size of peace estab- lish- ments per 1,000 inhab- itants, the U. S. army being taken as a unit.
Austria-Hungary.	45,405,307 ²	61,285,577	2,580,000	318,347	7.01	9.2
France.....	38,961,945 ³	138,349,056	3,500,000	531,395	13.64	17.9
Germany	56,367,178 ²	167,969,452	4,330,000	505,839	8.97	11.8
Great Britain ⁴	41,976,827 ³	139,907,458	909,123	272,133 ⁵	6.48	8.5
Japan ⁶	47,812,138 ⁷	19,273,990	1,000,000 ⁸	560,000 ⁸	11.71	15.4
Russia ⁹	107,446,199 ⁷	193,050,824	5,400,000	1,073,000	9.06	11.9
United States ¹⁰ ..	76,303,387 ²	68,783,140 ¹¹	100,000	58,268 ¹²	0.76	1.0

It must be borne in mind that we have never yet been pitted against the land forces of any first-class military Power. If the United States were to fight any of these nations at the present time how much success could its 100,000 dependable troops hope for against their trained regulars? How long could our army cope with the 800,000 veterans Japan was known to have had in Manchuria? *and history has recorded events far more improbable than that we may ultimately have to fight her in the Philippines.* At present we are at peace with all the world, and it is sincerely to be hoped that we shall continue our amicable relations for a long time to come; but, from the standpoint of true statesmanship, there is much sound advice in Machiavelli's maxim, "Treat your friends as if they will some day become your enemies, and your enemies as if they will some day become your friends." It is well-known to the military authorities of every nation that Japan could put her entire army in the Philippines within a month, the steaming-time from Nagasaki to Manila being about

¹The statistics in this table are taken from the Statesman's Year Book for 1906, and Hazell's Annual for 1907.—²Census of 1900.—³Census of 1901.—⁴England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland.—⁵Exclusive of the Indian Army.—⁶The principal islands.—⁷Census of 1905.—⁸The last Official Statement, dated Dec. 31st, 1900, gave the Japanese War footing as only 632,007, and the Peace footing as 167,629.—⁹Russia in Europe.—¹⁰Exclusive of Alaska and the Colonies.—¹¹Report of the Secretary of War, Dec. 12th, 1906, pp. 58-60.—¹²*Ibid*, pp. 1-2.

five days. How much chance would our forces have against her 800,000 veterans? Even if we possessed—which we do not—a large enough merchant marine to furnish the requisite number of transports to carry our entire Regular Army at once to the Philippines, our troops would be overwhelmed by mere numbers, our Volunteers certainly could not be got ready to sail within that time, and our Militia is prohibited by the Constitution from being used as such outside of the United States. The German military authorities claim that they can embark an army corps in three days, and, allowing sixteen days for crossing the Atlantic, could land more than 200,000 trained regulars within the territorial limits of the United States in five weeks; while it is also well known that, if we should ever be unfortunate enough to come to blows with England, she could put fully 150,000 trained troops on our northern boundary in thirty days. It is left to the reader to draw his own conclusions as to the ability of the United States to fight these forces with its present army and its untrained Volunteers and Militia.

An army is in reality nothing more than a national police; and, unless it is strong enough to maintain order at home and to prevent encroachment and insult from abroad, endless evils and shame must be suffered by the entire people. A strong army protects a nation against such calamities, and may therefore be likened to a strong insurance company conducted by the Government. According to the last statement prepared by the Bureau of Statistics, the "true valuation of real and personal property" in the United States amounted in 1900 to no less than \$94,300,000,000. The maintenance of the Regular Army of 58,368 officers and men in 1906 cost \$68,783,140.51, so that this charge, considered from the standpoint of insurance alone, is only 0.62 mills on the dollar or 62-1000 of one per cent. on the valuation of property. An army three times the size of our present army would, it is estimated, cost less than twice the above rate, or about \$1.24 *per annum* on every \$1,000 of property. The minimum rate of insurance upon dwelling-houses in cities is about \$1.50, and on offices seldom less than \$3 a year on each \$1,000 of property insured. If the reader is a business man, let him compare the rates which he pays the insurance companies with those charged by the United States Government, and ask himself

whether he considers \$1.24 an exorbitant yearly rate for the security which would be afforded to the nation by an army of 175,000 trained regulars.¹

Furthermore, there is an ethical as well as a business reason why the United States ought to possess more and better trained soldiers—Regular, Militia and Volunteer—than it now has. In law, contributory negligence which culminates in injury to life or property is always punished, yet our legislators have gone on, from 1776 down to the present day, apparently blind to the obligation that, as Adams declared, adequate “national defence is one of the cardinal duties of statesmen,” and it is indeed a most lamentable fact that *never once have our soldiers gone into a war for which Congress has made the necessary preparations beforehand*. Although one is fully ready to grant that awful blunders have often been made by the Army itself, yet, on the other hand, one cannot refrain from asking whether any set of men in whose hands reposes the power to mould the military organization and to provide all military supplies has the right—moral or otherwise—to send the flower of a country’s manhood to be sacrificed on the altar of national honor? At the very best, “war is hell”; and, when our soldiers are forced to die by thousands from wounds, fever, starvation, and lack of medicines and attention, who will attempt to hold blameless the legislators who have neglected their duty? When a man dies through the neglect of another man who might have prevented his death, does not the law call this neglect by a very dire name and punish it accordingly? Is the War Department accountable because, when 200,000 trained soldiers are needed at the outbreak of war, only half that number are forth-

¹The latter part of this paragraph, as originally published, read as follows:

The maintenance of the Regular Army of 64,336 officers and men in 1905 cost \$77,655,162.80, so that this charge, considered from the standpoint of insurance alone, is only 0.83 mills on the dollar, or 83-1000 of one per cent. on the valuation of property. An army three times the size of our present army would, it is estimated, cost less than twice the above rate, or about \$1.66 *per annum* on every \$1,000 of property. The minimum rate of insurance upon dwelling-houses in cities is about \$1.50, and on offices seldom less than \$3 a year on each \$1,000 of property insured. If the reader is a business man, let him compare the rates which he pays the insurance companies with those charged by the United States Government, and ask himself whether he considers \$1.66 an exorbitant yearly rate for the security which would be afforded to the nation by an army of 193,000 trained regulars.

coming? Is the War Department responsible, when vast quantities of supplies and medical stores are needed, that only a fraction is provided? Is the War Department to be blamed, when experienced officers are required to lead troops and to administer the branches of the Staff, and experienced surgeons to care for the sick and wounded, because ignorance and parsimony at the Capitol refuse to authorize their employment or to provide them with the proper education? Are Secretaries of War to be held at fault because they have inherited vicious systems and defective organizations which are utterly inadequate to the stress of war, when they were not responsible for the creation of them and when the genius of a Napoleon in their place would be powerless to make the proper changes? Have not the military blunders of our legislators cost appallingly enough already? How much longer are Americans to be taxed for the military education of our legislators who will *not* learn?

Most of us have thought heretofore that the United States had ample military protection, but we have been woefully deceived. If that wonderful fighting-machine known as the "Army of Austerlitz," of which Napoleon was so proud, abounded in defects which were clearly perceptible upon close examination, with how much more force could that criticism be applied to our Militia and Volunteers in their present condition? Only part of our Militia is organized, and even the organized portion is to-day so very deficient in training as to be practically useless against the regulars of other nations. On paper they may appear formidable enough, but in reality they are very similar to the feet of clay of the imposing figure in Nebuchadnezzar's dream. To be sure, our Regular Army may be likened to the iron legs; but, on the other hand, we must realize that, even if it were mobilized and recruited to the full war strength of 100,000 allowed by Congress, this process would require a minimum of sixty days under the most favorable circumstances. Furthermore, in the event of war we should undoubtedly have to keep 20,000 of the old troops in the Philippines and possibly have to send more of them to these islands. The remaining 34,659 enlisted men would have to be increased to 80,000, the result of which would be that *the Army within the United States would therefore contain only a fraction less than fifty-seven per cent. of recruits*, thus greatly diminishing its

actual fighting efficiency at the outset of war. In plain English, these are the numbers and this is the quality of the forces upon which, thanks to Congress, Americans would have to depend for their protection if war were declared to-morrow.

One hundred and twenty-five years ago Washington declared that we "ought to have a good army rather than a large one," and this statement is equally true at the present day. We do not require an immense standing army such as is maintained by each of the leading European nations, but we ought, assuredly, to have an army which should number in time of peace fully one soldier to each 1,000 of population, and in time of war at least 250,000. Since the exigencies of the professions and of business will undoubtedly prevent its ever being possible to give the Militia the training which would enable it to cope with foreign regulars, this organization must be relegated to the third line of defence, and nothing more should be expected of it. The creation of a First Reserve similar to that which exists in every European army is therefore imperative, and this Reserve ought to consist at least of 100,000 men who have had some previous experience in the Regular Army or in the United States Volunteers during actual war. If Congress will only provide some such organization *in sufficient time to be in thorough working order before our next war*, and, in its formation, will carefully remember the cardinal rule enunciated by Calhoun eighty-five years ago, *viz., "that at the commencement of hostilities there should be nothing either to new model or create,"*¹ some profit will then at last have been derived

¹The Act of March 2nd, 1821, was the outcome of a resolution of the House of Representatives on May 11th, 1820, directing the Secretary of War to report at the next session "a plan for the reduction of the Army to 6,000 non-commissioned officers and privates. . . ."

The plan presented by Mr. Calhoun is worthy of the most careful study even at the present time; it is a most remarkable document, inasmuch as he traced the general scheme for an expansive organization such as every army in Europe has now found it necessary to adopt. In his report to Congress, made in December, 1820, Mr. Calhoun wrote:

"If our liberty should ever be endangered by the military power gaining the ascendancy, it will be from the necessity of making those mighty and irregular efforts to retrieve our affairs after a series of disasters, caused by the want of adequate military knowledge, just as in our physical system a state of the most dangerous excitement and paroxysm follows that of the greatest debility and prostration. To avoid these dangerous consequences, and to prepare the country to meet a state of war, particularly at its commencement, with honor and safety, much must depend on the organization of our military peace establishment, and I have accordingly, in a plan about to be proposed for the reduction

from the costly lessons of the past, and the United States may finally be assured of adequate protection.

No nation in the entire history of the world has yet neglected its military strength without ultimately paying the penalty. France was the foremost military power from 1800 to 1812, and again in 1860, and Russia was presumed to be invincible less than four years ago. Yet we all know what terrible humiliation France underwent in 1870-1871 and what defeats Russia has just suffered. Do we fondly imagine that we are going to escape the consequences, when, in actual fact, we are not one whit better prepared for war than they were? We have gone on entirely too long laboring under a grave delusion, and giving a new version to the old proverb so as to make it read, "The Lord takes care of babes, fools and the United States!" We have become a "World-Power," with duties and responsibilities which we never have had before. We have rich possessions upon which other nations naturally look with covetous eyes; we have a great country whose prosperity is unexampled. Unless we are strong enough to hold the one and to protect the other, our day of reckoning is sure to come.

When will our American people awake to the facts, and when will our legislators heed the handwriting on the wall?

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER.

of the Army, directed my attention mainly to that point, believing it to be of the greatest importance.

"To give such an organization, the leading principles in its formation ought to be that, at the commencement of hostilities, there should be nothing either to new model or to create. The only difference, consequently, between the peace and the war formation of the Army, ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter, and the only change in passing from the former to the latter should consist in giving to it the augmentation which will then be necessary.

"It is thus, and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made without confusion or disorder, and the weakness and danger which otherwise would be inevitable be avoided. Two consequences result from this principle: First, the organization of the staff in a peace establishment ought to be such that every branch of it should be completely formed, with such extension as the number of troops and posts occupied may render necessary; and, secondly, that the organization of the line ought, as far as practicable, to be such that, in passing from the peace to the war formation, the force may be sufficiently augmented without adding new regiments or battalions, thus raising the war on the basis of the peace establishment, instead of creating a new army to be added to the old, as at the commencement of the late war."—American State Papers, II, p. 189. The italics are ours.

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION LIBRARIES

3 9088 00098 7776